Chinese meritocracy vs. Western democracy: should we reconsider our ways?

From the perspective of a meritocratic political system:

1. Political leaders should be chosen based on above-average ability.

2. We must articulate a political system that perpetuates such selection.

This idea is anathema in an anemic Western culture that eschews merit as a form of "ableism." Not so in Chinese political theory.

1. In China, political meritocracy is an essential component to a healthy political system. As the pedigree-grounded notion of aristocracy began to decay around the Spring and Autumn period, the idea of "elevating the worthy" came to the fore. Confucius advocated universal education but acknowledged that different individuals have enduring differences in ability. The political system must therefore select those with superior ability. Imperial China's meritocracy was institutionalized through their imperial examination system. Korea and Vietnam eventually adopted similar systems. This "guardianship discourse" is widely supported in China, and is not entirely dissimilar to the system of meritocracy advocated by the ancient Greek philosopher Plato.

2. Democracy is seriously problematic. Chinese meritocracy can help! In the West, "Capitalist interests have disproportionate power in the political process, especially in the American political system which has been described...as one-dollar one-vote rather than one-person one-vote...voters are selfishly concerned with their narrow material interest, and ignore the interests of future generations and people living outside national boundaries who are affected by the policies of the government." Indeed, Bryan Caplan draws on a great deal of empirical research to demonstrate that tests of voter competence should be administered in an effort to ensure that truly informed and intelligent voters are visiting the polls. J.S. Mill argued in the 19th century that the highly educated should be given more votes, but, as mentioned before, this notion would be condemned in our hyper-egalitarian society.

3. Although Communist in name, China's Communist Party has become increasingly meritocratic. This is certainly more in keeping with historically normative Chinese political ideas. Jiang Qing draws on the Confucian concept of sources of legitimacy being drawn from Heaven and Earth rather than only in terms of the Western notion of popular sovereignty (of course, this would not have to follow a specifically Confucian metaphysical framework). This would entail "a tri-cameral legislature, with authority divided between a House of the People, a House of Confucian Scholars, and a House of Cultural Continuity that correspond to the three forms of legitimacy." Joseph Chan and Bai Tongdong have also suggested hybrid regimes that combine elements of both Eastern meritocracy and Western democracy. This would be composed of "meritocratic houses of government...of political leaders chosen by such means as examination and performance at lower levels of government." Daniel Bell himself likewise suggested a hybrid regime that would involve a "meritocratic house of government termed the House of Exemplary Persons."

Mao himself was not crazy about China's Confucian meritocracy:

"In its early days, Communist China under Mao explicitly rejected Confucian-inspired ideas of political meritocracy. Understandably, perhaps, the main task was rewarding revolutionary energy and securing military strength for the state to put an end to abuse and bullying by foreign powers. But now, the establishment of a relatively secure and strong Chinese state under the leadership of the CCP means that China has less to worry about survival qua political community. Hence, the emphasis has shifted to the task of good governance led by able and virtuous political leaders, and the selection and promotion mechanisms of the CCP have become more meritocratic."
...
To illustrate the rigorous (meritocratic) nature of selection at higher levels of government, Minister Li described the procedure used to select the secretary general of the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee. First, there was a nomination process, including retired cadres. Those who received many nominations could move to the next stage. Next, there was an examination, including such questions as how to be a good Secretary General. Over 10 people took the exam, and the list was narrowed to five people. To ensure that the process was fair, the examination papers were put in the corridor for all to judge the results. Then, there was an oral examination with an interview panel composed of ministers, vice-ministers, and university professors.
To ensure transparency and fairness, ordinary cadres who work for the General Secretary were in the room, which allowed them to supervise the whole process. Three candidates with the highest score were selected for the next stage. Then, the department of personnel led an inspection team to look into the performance and virtue of the candidates, with more emphasis placed on virtue. Two people were recommended for the next stage. The final decision was made by a committee of 12 ministers who each had a vote, and the candidate had to have at least eight votes to succeed. If the required number of votes was not secured the first time, the ministers discussed further until two-thirds could agree on a candidate."

Daniel A. Bell, author of the controversial The China Model Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy and dean of the School of Political Science and Public Administration at Shandong University in Qingdao, argues that China's meritocracy is, in many respects, superior to Western liberal democracy.

"Westerners tend to divide the political world into "good" democracies and "bad" authoritarian regimes. But the Chinese political model does not fit neatly in either category. Over the past three decades, China has evolved a political system that can best be described as "political meritocracy." The China Model seeks to understand the ideals and the reality of this unique political system. How do the ideals of political meritocracy set the standard for evaluating political progress (and regress) in China? How can China avoid the disadvantages of political meritocracy? And how can political meritocracy best be combined with democracy? Daniel Bell answers these questions and more.
Opening with a critique of "one person, one vote" as a way of choosing top leaders, Bell argues that Chinese-style political meritocracy can help to remedy the key flaws of electoral democracy. He discusses the advantages and pitfalls of political meritocracy, distinguishes between different ways of combining meritocracy and democracy, and argues that China has evolved a model of democratic meritocracy that is morally desirable and politically stable. Bell summarizes and evaluates the "China model"—meritocracy at the top, experimentation in the middle, and democracy at the bottom—and its implications for the rest of the world.
A timely and original book that will stir up interest and debate, The China Model looks at a political system that not only has had a long history in China, but could prove to be the most important political development of the twenty-first century."

Bell certainly has some controversial ideas:

"The advantages of “actually-existing” meritocracy in the Chinese Communist Party are clear. Cadres are put through a grueling process of talent selection, and only those with an excellent record of past performance are likely to make it to the highest levels of government. The training process includes the cultivation of virtues such as compassion for the disadvantaged by such means as limited periods of work in poor rural areas.
Moreover, this kind of meritocratic selection process is only likely to work in the context of a one-party state. In a multi-party state, there is no assurance that performance at lower levels of government will be rewarded at higher levels, and there is no strong incentive to train cadres so that they have experience at higher levels, because the key personnel can change with a government led by different party. So even talented leaders, like President Obama, can make many “beginner’s mistakes” once they assume rule because they haven’t been properly trained to assume command at the highest levels of government. Leaders in China are not likely to make such mistakes because of their experience and training. The fact that decision-making at the highest-levels is by committee — the nine-member Standing Committee of the Politburo — also ensures that no one person with outlandish and uninformed views can decide upon wrong-headed policies (such as Lee Kuan Yew’s policies in Singapore favoring births by educated women that were based on eugenics theories rejected by most scientists)."

As Bell explains, instead of the future depending upon the myopic perspective of oftentimes uninformed and uneducated voters, Chinese leaders are in a position of being able to make decisions that take seriously all relevant stakeholders, which includes those both within the nation, and their future generations, as well as those living outside of the country. This is in contrast to a liberal democracy in which leaders are selected through competitive elections. In our system, leaders tend to be more concerned about winning the next election rather than focusing on the political decisions that have longer-term consequences for our country's citizens and those around the globe.

"Moreover, the fact that the real power holders in Western-style democracies are supposed to be those chosen by the people in elections often means that "bureaucrats" are not considered to be as important; hence, less talent goes to the bureaucracy. This flaw may be particularly clear in the American political system. A recent conversation with a young recipient of a Rhodes scholarship is revealing. She is interested in international affairs, and I suggested that perhaps she can join the U.S. State Department, but she said that she had been warned that it's hard for people of ambition and talent to succeed in that setting. In contrast, Chinese political system does not clearly distinguish between "bureaucrats" and "power-holders" and thus ambitious people of talent are not discouraged from joining the political system at the lower levels, with the hope of moving upwards."

Of course, this style of government is stable and workable in a political culture that favors meritocracy; East Asian countries with Confucian heritages such as China typically value meritocracy, whereas the equality-obsessed culture of America's political culture may tend to reject such a system as elitist and unfair. Indeed, it is hard to imagine, as Bell points out, support for a one-party system that favors meritocracy.

China's meritocracy has seen the most impressive alleviation of poverty in recorded history. There are some problems with their system, of course, such as harsh repression of political dissent. While Bell concedes that this may have something to do with China lacking democracy at certain levels of government (this could conceivably check abuses of power), some of these problems, he says, could be conceivably checked through developing its meritocracy further.

The term "meritocracy" itself comes from Michael Young's 1958 book The Rise of Meritocracy, in whch he defined merit as "IQ plus effort." He anticipated the rise of an increasingly meritocratic process of occupational and educational selection. Indeed, "During the 1940s and 1950s, American functionalists and post-War liberals and theorists on social mobility argued that meritocracy is a functionally necessary mechanism to select and reward individuals so as to meet the demands of the technical and economic rationality of an industrial society during its transition from traditionalism to post-industrialism." Interestingly enough, during this period, meritocracy was associated with Western industrial capitalism and professionalism, whereas the much older meritocratic tendencies of the Chinese civil service examination system, known as the Keju, was facing serious setbacks thanks to the decline of the scholar-official class and the collapse of the Manchu empire.

"The Imperial examinations or Keju (Traditional Chinese: 科舉 ; pinyin : kējǔ ), were an essential part of the Chinese government administration from their introduction in the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.E. to 220 C.E. ) until they were abolished during Qing attempts at modernization in 1905. The examination system was systematized in the Sui Dynasty (581–618) as an official method for recruiting bureaucrats. It was intended to ensure that appointment as a government official was based on merit and not on favoritism or heredity. Theoretically, any male adult in China, regardless of his wealth or social status, could become a high-ranking government official by passing the imperial examination. Examinations were given on four levels, local, provincial, metropolitan and national. Candidates on their knowledge of the Confucian classics, their ability to write, and the "Five Studies:" military strategy, civil law, revenue and taxation, agriculture, and geography. Though only about 5 percent of those who took them passed, the examinations served to maintain cultural unity and consensus on basic values and ensured the identification of the educated elite with national, rather than regional, goals and values."

...

"By 115 B.C.E., a curriculum had already been established. Scholars were tested for their proficiency in the Six Arts: music; archery and horsemanship; arithmetic; writing; and knowledge of the rituals and ceremonies, both public and those described in the Five Classics. The curriculum was then expanded to cover the "Five Studies:" military strategy, civil law, revenue and taxation, agriculture, and geography, in addition to the Confucian Classics.

Sui and T’ang Dynasties

The Sui Dynasty (581–618) adopted the Han examination system, systematizing it as an official method for recruiting bureaucrats. The Sui introduced a rule that the officials of a prefecture must be appointees of the central government rather than local aristocrats, and that the local militia was to be subject to the officials appointed by the central government.

During the T'ang dynasty (618–907), a system of local schools to prepare scholars for the civil service examinations was established. Those who hoped to enter the upper levels of the bureaucracy then competed in the chin-shih exams, which tested their knowledge of the Confucian Classics. These examinations gradually became the major means of selecting government officials; by the end of the T'ang dynasty, the old aristocracy had been supplanted by the scholar-gentry.

Unfortunately, the Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Party distanced themselves from the Keju system and the role of social selection associated with it. This very old system originated in both Daoism and Confucianism in the 5-6th centuries B.C. and were further developed through Legalists in the coming centuries. The highly competitive civil service examination system, known as the Keju, became its primary social and political embodiment, becoming established formally and officially in 608 during the Sui Dynasty. It was further developed in the Tang dynasty, and saw its institutionalization in 1368 under the Ming Dynasty, enjoying a long life until 1905.

Philosophically, the rise of meritocracy in China is frequently linked with Confucianism. As China's dominant political philosophy, social selection was carried out through examinations based on knowledge of Confucian texts, and this was an important component of the imperial political order. In this context, this ensured "the selection of the Confucian scholars in the feudal bureaucracy that in turn consolidated the imperial rule." This consolidation survived the tumultuous shifts between various dynasties, and it remained intact even after invasion by minorities. Some dispute a distinctly or solely Confucian origin for the rise of meritocracy in China, however:

"Elman put forth another explanation in his argument on the ‘interdependence’ of the feudal bureaucracy, gentry-literati elites and the examination selection (Elman 2000). Contrary to Ho’s argument, Elman further examined the relationships between the feudal ruling class and the scholar-literati class. He argued that the Keju system was constructed as part of the compromise between the two classes, and that the abolishment of the civil examinations as a social selection of scholar-officials came naturally in 1911 as a result of the demise of the Qing Dynasty" (Liu).

Although differing markedly in many philosophical, social and political respects, Confucius, Mencius and Legalists both insisted on "the functional necessity of social stratification as the key element for social cohesion in imperial China. Education was believed to bring an equilibrium, which both justified social stratification and enhanced social cohesion." Mencius was particularly emphatic that the state should set up universal education without class distinction and that this educational universality should not distinguish between social classes. Confucius and his followers were likewise troubled by the corrupt nature of feudal ruling classes and believed that social equity could be attained through universal education. This ensured a social order that was based on individual merit rather than hereditary status.

This, at least, is the account given by some scholars as to the rise of Chinese meritocracy. Unlike in Mencius, Confucian meritocracy did not aim to achieve social justice or equality or equity, but was strongly class-biased. It focused on the moral and intellectual superiority of the scholar class. Chinese aristocracy was nonetheless condemned by Confucius and Xunzi as lacking a basis in divine fiat, and it was therefore seen as illegitimate.

"The line of legitimate titles was interrupted continuously throughout hundreds of years, and the shifting dynasties and changing names of royalty illustrated this lack of consistent legitimacy for each dynasty. The first emperor of each new dynasty commenced his ruling with a ritual in which the previous dynasty was acknowledged and criticised for its failures in both conduct and morality (McDermott 1999). With this ritual, the legitimacy of the new dynasty was justified as a replacement for the immoral rule of the previous dynasty. Furthermore, Confucius and his followers demonstrated the inferiority in minds and virtues of those who performed ‘manual labour’, and, who were, therefore, unsuitable to rule (Huang and Gove 2012: 10). As Confucius put it: “some labour with their minds and some labour with their physical strength. Those who labour with their minds rule others, and these who labour with physical strength are ruled by others. These who are ruled sustain others and those who rule are sustained by others. This is a principle universally recognised” (Tu 1998: 17)" (Liu).

Thus, there was a major distinction acknowledged between the scholar-official class vs. the peasants, with the scholars ruling the peasants. Confucius and his followre were clear that government should be ruled by the most intelligent and virtuous and that these individuals should be selected on the basis of individual merit.

"The social group in imperial China that was considered the most wise and virtuous was the literati-scholar class, who were selected through an examination-based system, the Keju (Elman 2009). This Confucian perspective shared some similarities with the functional theory on social stratification, which was widely regarded as an early philosophical approach towards meritocracy (Elman 2013) and was used to argue that the belief in education was deeply rooted in Chinese culture" (Liu).

Nevertheless, some insist that this Confucian approach to meritocracy was a spurious philosophical justification of the privilege of the ruling class which was further solidified by its institutionalized civil examination system. How do we measure merit, in any case? Confucius and his followers "offered a cultural and literary measurement that has important implications on education and cultural capital" that emphasized "learning, administrative skills, moral quality, righteousness, uprightness and conscientiousness." The Legalists, on the other hand, emphasized military and agricultural skills.

"Between 657 and 828 in the Tang Dynasty, the Keju identified approximately sixty itemised criteria, which were narrowed down to a strong focus on the knowledge of classics, stereotyped theories and literacy attainment during the Ming and Qing Dynasty (Ho 1962: 11). The Keju selection system became institutionalised during this period, establishing examination pathways with two degrees and two curricula (Franke 1960; Elman 2014). These Confucian and neo-Confucian definitions of merit have obvious limitations. The all-embracing ideology of merit excluded some social groups such as merchants, artisans and peasants from social selection because the skills or knowledge they represented were regarded as labour skills that were inferior to the work of mind. The literati-scholar class was the only group qualified to demonstrate the official measures of merit. Hence, the Confucian ideology of meritocracy exclusively served the scholar-official class through an institutionalised system. Contrary to the concept of equality and social justice, the Confucian meritocracy served its own social class and discriminated against other social groups through the feudal institution of social selection. Hence, the Confucian ideology failed to go beyond feudal boundaries, as many scholars might suggest" (Liu).

For Ye Liu, therefore, the idea that Confucian education was universal was a "symbolic justification for social stratification." This is because education was an exclusive privilege for only some groups. Obviously, educational opportunities that did not made themselves available to everyone could not effectively engage in a truly meritocratic process of social selection. He summarizes this point by arguing that "The myth of the Confucian meritocracy that transcends feudalism lies in its confusion between social selection and social opportunity in imperial China." Confucius insisted that class boundaries did not exist in education and wanted equal educational opportunity to those of all social classes. While Mencius, as we saw before, clearly insisted that the state provide education for all, this is less clear in Confucius.

In any case, we see here a pre-modern version of social mobility through education. As Liu points out, however, it is not until 1022 in the Song Dynasty that we see the rise of the first state-funded school. This happened when the reformist statesman Fan Chung-yun administered a decree issued by the imperial court that educational facilities across all provinces and prefectures be made available. Unfortunately, there was no federal budget that was reserved exclusively for hiring teachers and building schools, and for this reason, establishment of educational institutions relied on the initiatives of local funding and local officials. For this reason, dynastic schools saw only 53 teachers hired in an empire of 1000 counties. By the end of the Northern Song in 1126, however, total recruitment of state schools was 1700, an would eventually peak to 3800.

As Liu notes, the imperial education system did not truly arise until the Ming Dynasty. Thus, although the civil service examination system had been in effect for a while, the imperial education system lagged far behind. Indeed, although the civil service examination system was established in 681 in the Sui Dynasty, the imperial education system did not arise until much later.

Where we speak of meritocracy, we also necessarily must deal with issues of equality and inequality. Li Chenyang believes there are two main elements of the Confucian understanding of inequality and equality:

1. Numerical equality - based on the Mencian idea that all humans are born with the same moral potential as well as the idea that all people have the same xing and the same potential for moral cultivation.

2.. Proportional equality - the idea main concept of equality in Confucian thought. This is realized in economic, moral and political realms.

Chenyang notes that Harry Frankfurt made the controversial point that equality is simply not inherently virtue. Chenyang makes, furthermore, that this is perfectly consistent with Confucian ethics. Chenyang makes some important points about how equality is an ideal that is impossible to actualize in life, such that we will always have to settle for ending up with some kind of inequality, and furthermore, that there are different forms of equality and different things which the word can mean:

"There is also considerable disagreement regarding specific terms of equality. There is the notion of moral equality, i.e., equal respect, equal worth, and equal dignity of all human beings. There is the notion of political equality, i.e., all people having the same civil and political rights. And there is the notion of economic equality, i.e., people being entitled to equal distribution of social wealth. Of distributive equality, we can also talk about equality of opportunity, equality of resources, and equality of welfare. I will not delve into these issues here as there is already a vast literature. The point I would like to make in order to set the context for my essay is that, no matter what kind of equality one embraces, it cannot be realized without producing some form or forms of inequality. For instance, promoting equality of resources will result in inequality of welfare; people who start with equal resources usually end up with different levels of welfare, due to various reasons. Promoting equality of opportunity will inevitably end up with inequality in outcome as people are naturally endowed in varied ways. In this sense, “equal opportunity” is a license for inequality in outcome and probably welfare. While inequality does not necessarily produce equality, any form of equality inevitably comes with inequality of other forms, because there is a necessary incompatibility between applying different concepts of equality in the same dimension, such as numerical equality versus proportional equality, as will be elaborated in this essay. As A.T. Nuyen has elegantly put, “no matter what X is, in order to maintain the equality of X, the chips will have to fall unevenly, or unequally, elsewhere” (Nuyen 2001: 67). Without inequality, no equality can achieved. Therefore, inequality is the currency of equality; it is either the price 55 we pay or the reward we reap in pursuing equality."

In a very Confucian vein, he argues that certain forms are not only morally legitimate but even important. Social stratification (an important Confucian principle) motivates people into performing necessary jobs that may otherwise not necessarily be desirable. Such unequal stratification may also give individuals incentives to perform better than others on desirable jobs. Chenyang follows Aristotle in distinguishing proportional equality from numerical equality:

1. Numerical equality - humans are treated indiscriminately without respect to individual circumstances. Thus, in taking a census or voting in an election, each person is treated as identical, and receives the value of "1."

2. Proportional equality - People are distinguished in relation to their due in relevant aspects. Chenyang notes that Aristotle uses the example of individuals being treated "to each according to his desert" where individuals are paid differently or regarded differently in proportion to the value of their labor. He goes on to explain how proportional equality can entail treating people differently without resulting in genuine inequality, as in the case of helping disabled people with wheelchair ramps and other accommodations:

"A person’s due is what he deserves or is appropriately accorded to him; it is not based solely on what he has contributed or earned. We may say, for example, that in a good society a physically disabled person is to be duly provided with special facilities even though he may have not done anything to earn it. Understood this way, proportional equality demands that society provide special facilities to the disabled, but not to people who are not disabled. This apparently unequal treatment is nevertheless equality in the proportional sense. From the sole perspective of numerical equality, proportional equality is a form of inequality, because it allows varied treatments and often varied allocations of resources. Conceptually, however, we should not confuse proportional equality with inequality. Proportional equality aims to achieve a form of equality, rather than inequality, while it brings about inequality as a by-product, whereas some inequalities (e.g., arbitrary discrimination against people) are just inequality, not by-products of proportional equality."

Chenyang says that Confucius embraces both numerical and proportional equality but with respect to distinct dimensions in society. He notes two respects in which Confucius can be said to accept numerical equality.

1. All humans have the same capacity for moral cultivation. Indeed, Mencius argues that all humans possess the four beginnings of moral qualities. Xunzi, likewise, believed that everyone possessed the same xing and that all people therefore had the potential to become a sage. This is an axiomatic feature of Confucian moral metaphysics; an indicative natural equality rather than a moral imperative. Of course, this ontological equality of potential does not issue in an ontological actuality of equality. Not all people will end up cultivating their moral potential to the same degree.

Confucius did not, of course, believe in equal potential for technical skill. Some people are simply naturally better at mathematics than others. In any case, Confucius still believed in universal education. Chenyang makes the amusing point that Confucius believed that only the very intelligent and the very dimwitted never change. Thus, Confucius seems to believe that everyone has a decent chance at improving their education.

Confucian educational norms have historically been aristocratic and meritocratic, but also geared towards equality. The Wangzhi Chapter of the Book of Rites says that ancient China selected scholar-officials at the level of the local district and the top scholars at this level were awarded the title of "Excellent Scholar." Those who were not at the top but school scored above average were regarded as "select scholars." These select scholars could teach others and those who excelled here became "outstanding scholars." The highest achievers were known as "accomplished scholars." Outstanding and Accomplished scholars were both exempt from draft to state labor.

Equal opportunity was also available in selecting government officials. Talented individuals were given relevant examinations and were tested to see if they performed their functions well, and they were given the position if they succeeded. Chenyang notes that although everyone in theory had he opportunity to succeed here, the very poor did not have a fair chance. For this reason, he points out another element of Confucian philosophy called "enriching the people."

2. Numerical equality - This actualized itself in the roles individuals had in society. People have different roles but these different roles are still "equal" in value. Chenyang refers to this equality as role-based numerical equality. According to Confucius' principle of the "rectification of names," he argued that the ruler should behave as a ruler, in accordance with how the ruler is defined, the minister should behave according to the definition of a minister, and so on.

Role-based numerical equality is universal without being general. That is, it is "universal" in that those who possess a certain title must perform the same tasks. All fathers, for example, must raise children appropriately.

The Confucian notion of proportional equality is based on the idea that an ordered society must have relevant divisions of labor, and this division of labor will naturally entail social stratification. These divisions, rather than being arbitrary, are based on inequalities of ability. Although he believed everyone should be educated, he acknowledged that different people have different endowments of talent. Confucius acknowledged that natural talent, though necessary for some tasks, is not sufficient, and the individual must put forth effort. Likewise, he acknowledged that sometimes someone with no natural talent can succeed in tasks through effort. Nevertheless, even if everyone tries their hardest, some will lag behind in the race due to natural differences in ability. Thus, Confucius is here anticipating the articulation of meritocracy as "IQ + Effort."

Xunzi, Chenyang says, provided the most elaborate link between an effective society and social stratification. Regarding humans as inherently social, he insisted on the necessity that society have divisions of labor for proper functioning.

"Ancient Kings devised to discriminate people by making ritual and moral principles, so that there are different statuses between the noble and humble, disparities between the senior and junior, classes between the intelligent and able on the one hand, and the stupid and incapable on the other. Thus, the Ancient Kings enabled people to carry on their respective work and consequently received their due."

This is quite different from the ressentiment-fueled explanation of the origins of inequality in someone like Rousseau, who argued that a combination of self-love and vanity resulted in inequality. Although we all have the sort of self-love which would result in our desire for self-preservation, it is our desire to outdo others, he thought, that resulted in inequality. Xunzi does acknowledge that such desires contribute to inequality, but he regarded inequality as a necessary component of a good and orderly society. As Chenyang says:

"For Xunzi, human desires are also the ultimate causes for social inequality, but in a different way. Xunzi held that desires lead to competition for resources. Without proper social organization, competition leads to chaos and poverty. While proper social organization prevents chaos and poverty, it also necessitates social hierarchy and hence inequality. Thus, in Xunzi inequality as an ingredient of social organization is a mechanism to funnel human desires effectively in a productive way. It is necessary for a functional society. Only a society with appropriately established social stratification can be a good and orderly society. Only such a society can be harmonious. He concluded, this is "the way to make the whole populace live together in harmony and unity.""

Xunzi referred to this proportional equality as "zhi ping." "Zhi" means "the fullest" or "the utmost" and "Ping" means "equal" and "fair." Chenyang notes that some writers argue that true equality, in Xunzi's thought, can actually only come about when there are actual differences or inequalities in a role. In this respect, "There is equality only insofar as they are not equal" or "Pure equality is not equality." These are two translations of an actual phrase found in Xunzi's writing. Thus, for Xunzi, fairness and justice consisted of actual inequalities, and this was his understanding of proportionate equality.

Confucius saw proportional equality as applying to three elements of society:

1. Economic - People are rewarded economically in accordance with their due. Xunzi defined such a society as "unequal yet equivalent, bent yet obedient, not the same yet uniform." As Chenyang says, "Equality is implied in a form of inequality. Parity is achieved through apparent disparities.

Although some people would rather have it another way (e.g., get more with less contribution), they are funneled ("bent") into a well-established system and would follow the arrangement, "Not the same yet uniform."" In this respect, Xunzi acknowledges that ideological coercion is actually necessary to cause those of inferior ability to accept their political arrangement.

In this respect, "So though one may have as his emolument the whole world, he need not consider it excessive, and though one be only a gatekeeper, receptionist, guard or nightwatchman, he need never think his salary too meager." Difference in tasks based on difference in abilities will entail difference in income, but there is nothing wrong with this for Xunzi. As Chenyang says, "This recognition of differentiation in economic distribution is consistent with the principle of proportional equality. Xunzi's proportional distribution system is supplemented by a social welfare policy that the government would provide accommodations for orphans and the childless elderly, and would subsidize the poor and needy. As far as distribution policy is concerned, Xunzi strictly promoted a principle of proportional equality based on contribution." Thus, Xunzi anticipates a kind of sufficientarian approach to social welfare distribution, insofar as the poor are given assistance but are not given as much as the well-off.

The Confucian position on welfare distribution is unclear. Chenyang says that there should be "even" distribution of wealth, which to some readers suggests an egalitarian distribution of wealth, but he notes that "even" is a relative term and it is not clear how Confucius understands this. Chenyang argues that Confucius is not a strict egalitarian in economic matters.

"While Confucius promoted a philosophy of making people rich, he also understood that things are not equal. The Book of Rites records Confucius promoting a policy to ensure that "rich people are not pretentious and poor people are not in poverty." In his classic commentary Zheng Xuan remarked that "this implies that there are different kinds of land for farmers and different posts for scholar-officials. Just as there are officials at various posts, farmers are better or worse off due to different levels of productivity in their fields. Confucius recognized that in society there are (relatively) rich people and poor people, due to a variety of reasons, such as farmers possessing fertile or barren land. The Book of Rites also records Confucius saying that rich local lords should not have wealth more than the value of one hundred military wagons. That amount was of course very large; the vast majority of people at that time were not remotely close to that kind of wealth. This may not mean that Confucius held that some people should have that kind of wealth. It does, however, suggest that Confucius recognized uneven wealth and that he was not an egalitarian."

In light of this, Chenyang insists that Confucius was not an egalitarian. We should not read into "even distribution" a kind of egalitarianism. He does argue, however, that Confucius does seem to be opposing too large a gap between rich and people, and other Confucian philosophers have likewise taken Confucius's concept of "jun" in a way that is consistent with proportional equality. Chenyang cites the Han Confucian Dong Zhongshu as arguing that Confucius' point about letting the rich be rich enough to show their wealth without being pretentious is appropriate, and the poor should have enough to not worry about their livelihood. In this respect, Confucius is seen as teaching proportional equality without teaching outright egalitarianism.

2. Moral equality is another realm in which Confucian's doctrine of proportional equality is important. The concept of "jing" can refer to respect or reverence and plays a key role in Confucian political philosophy. Confucius' disciplines did not "jing" Zilu when he failed to exhibit superior musical talent, fo example. Confucius likewise advises men to "jing" their wives and children in the Book of Rites. Love and "jing," Chenyang notes, are seen by Confucius as the foundation of good government. He believed that the morally cultivated persons "jing" everyone, both their superiors and inferiors.

1. Do we owe everyone the same respect?

2. Do we owe everyone the same moral consideration?

Chenyang notes that Stephen Darwall distinguishes two kinds of respect:

1. Recognition respect - giving appropriate consideration to a specific feature of an object. This is due everyone.

2. Appraisal respect - this differs between people and admits of degrees.

Confucius insists on basic respect for everyone insofar as all humans have the potential to morally cultivate themselves. In this respect, all humans are categorically different from animals. When it comes to regarding people of different statuses, however, the morally cultivated and those who are not cultivated do not deserve the same level of respect. Morally cultivated individuals deserve greater levels of respect form his perspective. As Chenyang says, "people of varied moral achievements should receive appropriately differentiated respect. In one sense, we can say that these are two kinds of respect: respect on the basis of inborn moral potential and respect on the basis of moral achievement. We can call them Heavenly-endowed, unearned respect, on the one hand, and earned respect on the other."

Chenyang argues that Darwall's categorization is problematic from a Confucian perspective insofar as recognition involves appraisal-based and recognition-based respect both admit of degrees. He cites Mencius noting three things in the world that command our respect:

1. Rank - Based on social relationships. A president is accorded more respect than an average citizen.

2. Age - Based on age differentials. An elder is to be respected more than a child.

3. Virtue - Based on moral relationships.A human's value increases as they advance morally and become more cultivated but it can also decrease when they lose their virtue. Mencius even said it was possible for a human to become an animal through loss of virtue. Confucius advocated the cultivation of worthiness or "xian." Such a person possesses moral supremacy. It is inappropriate to regard the morally cultivated and uncultivated equally, in Confucian society, since this would result in a disordered society.

The competent moral agent should regard different people differently.

"The other issue of moral equality is whether a competent moral agent should give every person the same consideration. In Confucian literature, this refers to the issue of whether we should care about all human beings equally or care with distinction. Confucianism promotes "love with distinction." A person should love his own family and others in close relationships first and more than he loves others. In terms of moral consideration, this means that people ind ifferent relationships exert unequal pull on us. This, of course, does not mean that people further away from us are not good people, nor that people close to us are necessarily more morally cultivated. Confucians regard human beings as essentially social beings whose existence and identity are rooted in social relationships. These relationships constitute a large part of our identity and are the "home base" of our existence. Therefore, people close to us command more of our moral obligation. In this sense, all people are not morally equal to us."

Chenyang makes the intriguing point that Confucian ethics are very different from Kantian ethics. Confucius is more relational in his understanding of morality than Kant's more abstract understanding of morality.

"The English word "moral" here translates...roughly "Dao and virtue" and "relationship-based reasonable order." In this understanding, Confucian "lunli" necessarily includes maintaining appropriate relationships. In the Confucian sense, a person's obligations toward his parents are unequivocally moral obligations. One may argue that there is a distinction between moral obligation narrowly defined (as in the Kantian sense) and moral obligations broadly defined (as in "lunli") and that all people are morally equal in the narrow sense but not in the broad sense. Confucianism as virtue ethics, however, does not draw a line between these conceptions. From the Confucian perspective, "moral" in the Kantian sense cannot be exercised independently of "daode" and "lunli." When a person assesses her moral obligation to her parents and strangers, she does not tally one kind of obligation first and then add another kind. From each moral patient the pull comes to her as one, not two, forces."

3. Political - This refers to the extent to which citizens have equal say in governmental decisions. Confucius most certainly does not endorse the idea that every citizen should have equal access to political decision-making processes and participation in government, making laws, equal opportunity in selecting government officials, and so on. Proportional equality in the political realm results in actual inequality.

Although Confucius advocated universal education, he acknowledged that some people lack the capacity for certain rules, comparing them to rotten wood incapable of being carved into something useful. These differences in ability, as Mencius says, require major differences in division of labor. As Chenyang explains, Mencius understood that different people have different capabilities and these differences in capabilities suit them for different tasks:

"This principle includes political division of labor. Mencius said, “people either work with their minds or with their physical labor. Those working with minds govern others. Those working with physical labor are being governed” (Mencius 3a4; TTC: 2705). Some people engage in work that relies primarily on mental power, such as political offices in administration and management, whereas others engage in manual labor. Even though today’s division of labor has become more complex, the general rationale remains intact. No matter how a society is organized, it always has people in different social stations, doing varied tasks, and engaging in uneven participation in political processes. Confucians are realistic and honest about this.

Sidney Verba says, “True political equality, where all ordinary citizens (i.e., those not in governmental decision making positions) have equal influence, would be impossible to attain and probably very bad” (Verba, 2011). It would probably be very bad, Confucians say, because the ignorant and even the crooked would influence the direction of politics in wrong ways. In The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies, Bryan Caplan shows how average voters in the United States make misinformed, irrational choices at the voting booth (Caplan 2007). His research shows that, out of ignorance and biases, voters constantly make stupid choices on economic policy issues. If average voters make bad choices on economic policies, their performance can only be worse on noneconomic issues, such as education and foreign policy, which are further from people’s concern with their wallet. Caplan’s research also shows that there is a positive correlation between voters’ education levels and their ability to make rational choices, and suggests a more meritocratic approach (Caplan, 2006), which Confucians can endorse."

Thus, Confucius was no fan of democracy. He believed that only virtuous and highly talented people should possess the power to make decisions for society. For Confucius, some actual inequalities are good and some are bad. Equality in political power is something Confucius would regard as bad.

As Francis Fukuyama has noted, this controversial preference for authoritarianism is something many Asian nations have come to agree with:

"The caning for vandalism last year of American high-school student Michael Fay by the Singaporean authorities underscored the challenge now being put forth by Asian societies to the United States and other Western democracies. The issue was not simply whether Singapore, as a sovereign state, had the right to subject an American expatriate to its laws and legal procedures, but a much more fundamental one. In effect, the Singaporeans used the case of Michael Fay to argue in favor of their brand of authoritarianism, charging that American democracy, with its rampant social problems and general disorder, could not be regarded as a model for an Asian society. This claim forms part of a larger argument that Singaporeans, beginning with former prime minister Lee Kuan Yew, have been making for some time now to the effect that Western-style democracy is incompatible with Confucianism, and that the latter constitutes a much more coherent ideological basis for a well-ordered Asian society than Western notions of individual liberty. 1 While Singaporeans have been the most outspoken proponents of this view, many people in other Asian societies, from Thailand to Japan, have come to share their beliefs. The standing of the United States in Asia has already been affected: on the issue of using trade policy to pressure China into bettering its human rights record, Washington had few allies in the region, and it was forced to back down on its threat of withdrawing China’s most-favored-nation (MFN) status.

Are Confucianism and Western-style democracy fundamentally [End Page 20] incompatible? Will Asia formulate a new kind of political-economic order that is different in principle from Western capitalist democracy? The fact is that there are fewer points of incompatibility between Confucianism and democracy than many people in both Asia and the West believe. The essence of postwar “modernization theory” is correct: Economic development tends to be followed by political liberalization. 2 If the rapid economic development that Asia has experienced in recent years is sustained, the region’s democratization will continue as well. In the end, however, the contours of Asian democracy may be very different from those of contemporary American democracy, which has experienced serious problems of its own in reconciling individual rights with the interests of the larger community."

Fukuyama acknowledges that many East Asians root this un-democratic or anti-democratic sentiment in a (mistaken, in his view) perception that Confucianism is inherently anti-democratic or undemocratic:

"The most prominent proponent of an Asian alternative to democracy has been former Singaporean prime minister Lee Kuan Yew. Singapore under Lee developed a model of what might be called a "soft" or paternalistic form of authoritarianism, which combined capitalism with an authoritarian political system that suppressed freedom of speech and political dissent while intervening, often intrusively, in its citizens' personal lives. Lee has argued that this model is more appropriate to East Asia's Confucian cultural traditions than is the Western democratic model. In fact, he has said that Western-style democracy would have deleterious effects in a society like that of Singapore, encouraging permissiveness, social instability, and economically irrational decision making. Many Western authorities on democracy would agree with this assessment of the relationship between Confucianism and democracy. Samuel P. Huntington, for example, has written that "Confucian democracy" is a contradiction in terms: Almost no scholarly disagreement exists regarding the proposition that traditional Confucianism was either undemocratic or antidemocratic. . . . Classic Chinese Confucianism and its derivatives in Korea, Vietnam, Singapore, Taiwan, and (in diluted fashion) Japan emphasized the group over the individual, authority over liberty, and responsibilities over rights. Confucian societies lacked a tradition of rights against the state; to the extent that individual rights did exist, they were created by the state. Harmony and cooperation were preferred over disagreement and competition. The maintenance of order and respect for hierarchy were central values. The conflict of ideas, groups, and parties was viewed as [End Page 24] dangerous and illegitimate. Most important, Confucianism merged society and the state and provided no legitimacy for autonomous social institutions at the national level. 10 According to Huntington, the only Asian countries to experience democracy prior to 1990 were Japan and the Philippines, and democratic transitions there were possible only because both countries were influenced directly by the United States and were less Confucian than other Asian societies."

I originally published this here