God’s way of knowing: a comparison between Proclus and Avicenna on Providence and Divine knowledge

Also, see:
Avicenna on natural bodies
God as necessary and First existence

Introduction

The aim of this essay will be to make a comparison between Proclus’ and Avicenna’s analyses of Providence, in order to trace the differences and similarities in both accounts of Divine knowledge. I want to make this comparison in order to trace to what extent the Neoplatonic attitude towards Providence is retained by both thinkers and on how it differs from it. I want to focus exclusively on Providence as a mode of knowledge as such and less so insofar it is dependent on the kind of First Cause that underlies it, i.e. the existent that has the knowledge that is said to be Providence. For that would too far-fetched and would divert the attention of the paper much more to the nature of a First Cause in both philosophers, which would immediately become problematic since Proclus is a known pagan Neoplatonist from Late Antiquity (Helmig and Steel 2017) and Avicenna was an early Islamic Philosopher. (Gutas 2017) (1) Instead, focusing on Providence as a mode of knowledge reveals to us what according to both philosophers is the first cause (qua superior being) what it knows, how it is able to know what it knows and how, if at all, it differs from our (human) epistemic mode of thinking and most interestingly, how this knowledge affects us, if at all. For there are several reasons why God’s knowledge of the world is problematic for the human insofar he has a free will as will be discussed further on. To make the comparison clear and viable, I will i) make two systematic reconstructions of both Proclus’ and Avicenna’s descriptions of Providence, answering in both reconstructions aforementioned questions and ii) critically compare both thinkers and assess in what ways both views have strength and flaws. (2)

Proclus’ account of Providence

In his ‘On Providence’, Proclus sets out in a letter a defence of the human free will in opposition to his friend’s (Theodore) conviction that the world is utterly deterministic, as a result from an eclectic Stoic interpretation of the world. Here, we will focus less so on the defence of the free will, only insofar Providence might seem to limit it. First, Proclus divides fate from Providence so that fate is the force that is prior to the natural world and is the cause of the connections within it (so of causality); the natural world, therefore, is determined by fate. (Prov. 46-47) It is exclusively active within the corporeal realm, in the realm of bodily existents. In opposition to this, Providence presides in both the intelligible (intellectual) and the sensible (bodily) realm and is for that reason superior to fate. (Prov. 47) Providence is the ‘source of goods’: this definition put forward because according to Proclus only from God (being a first cause) the good things can emanate. I take it from this to mean that on one hand fate is deterministic, since it causes the necessary movement in bodies, but on the other hand, following his understanding of Plato, Proclus excludes necessity from the intellectual realm. As such, the intellect rules over fate. Here I think Proclus attempts to separate necessity from the Intellect, because whatever it does and causes is not determined in the same way the movement of bodies in the natural world are determined by fate, otherwise there would be no ‘purpose’ in the determined causal chain of the Intellect. Rather, Providence as a ‘source of goodness’ is prior to fate also in a way that it is presented with the ‘freedom’ to emanate goodness. This might, however, lead into a predetermined nature of Providence (in that it cannot escape what it predetermines to be good), but that’s not a criticism that Proclus acknowledges in this treatise. (Prov. 47-48) (3) However, what can be defined here as the problem of Providence with regard to human freedom is that if God knows whatever will happen, it seems that human freedom is in fact vastly determined by His knowledge. To draw a contrast between two contemporary schools of thought, the Peripatetics preserve contingency by stating that God has knowledge of contingencies as contingencies, so He has knowledge in an indeterminate way. In opposition to this, the Stoics, being determinists themselves don’t see a problem with regard to Providence as a determinate kind of knowledge. Proclus states against this that we must not understand the mode of knowledge of God as if it was the same as ours with regards to objects of knowledge. The epistemic mode is not determined by the object of knowledge, but by the subject, the knowing being. Since we are looking at the divine mode of knowledge, its intellectuality and superiority is to be understood in an absolute sense:

[the gods] anticipate all things in a superior way, that is in the manner of their own existence: in a timeless way what exists according to time, as we have said, in an incorporeal way the bodies, in an immaterial way the material things, in a determinate way what is indeterminate, in a stable way what is unstable, and in an undegenerated way what is generated. (Prov. 71)

Thus, the future, as something that is an object of knowledge of our epistemic mode, is indeterminate; but insofar it is the knowledge of the gods, it is a determinate foreknowledge. We as humans then, acting according to our own nature are dealing with choices that are foreknown by God, not because we conceive it to be determinate, but because of a determination in the foreknowledge of God. (Prov. 71)

Avicenna’s account of Providence

For Avicenna, Providence consists in the Necessary Existent having knowledge of His existence of the ‘order of good’ in His Being. (Met. 9.6.2) He is able to apprehend Himself in the clearest way possible. In order to elucidate how evil still is possible, Avicenna establishes a detailed account of physical, psychological and moral evils and posits it within God’s knowledge of the best order of goodness. First of all, we have to understand evil: it might be a deficiency in the sense of a type of ignorance, or it might be the apprehending of a cause that negates the good, that is apprehending any cause that impedes something to come into perfection, such as apprehending clouds that cast their shadows and prevent the sun from shining its light on the earth’s surface. (Met. 9.6.2) Secondly, all cause of evil is only found within the sublunary sphere, i.e. on earth. (Met. 9.6.7) Thirdly, evil in individual existents might be sparse, but insofar it exists in existents it necessarily follows from the ‘need for the good’. (Met. 9.6.9) Moreover, it seems that evil is only something that afflicts particulars (existents) and not species; But how does this make sense in the light of Providence insofar God’s knowledge is said to be good? The Necessary Existent doesn’t give heed to the bad consequences that occur by necessity. (Met. 9.6.23) Evil, in a sense is a necessity brought into the human-inhabited world as a means of keeping a balance in the universe: evil is an accidental necessity that was brought into the world to maintain the balance of the world and even of the universal order. (9.6.23) (4) So insofar Providence is good, it allows things in the sublunary world to become evil. Note that it is existents that can become evil; the species are not inflicted with evil: there is therefore no potentiality from which evil necessarily actualizes; it is as stated before, accidental, but necessarily accidental.

     There is a second major element in God’s knowledge: “[He] knows particular things, but in a universal way”. (Met. 10.1.7) (5) If we take this to mean that God knows particulars in a universal way, and if Avicenna means by this particulars both in the celestial realm as in the realm of generation and corruption, does He have knowledge of individual entities or even of individual events? Since the sublunary world is material, contingent and constantly changing this might seem problematic. Marmura (1962, 302-303) argues that it is impossible for Avicenna to extend what he states about particulars from the celestial realm to the sublunary realm both qua existents and events, since he himself states that in any species which is actualized in more than one particular, it is impossible to have knowledge of it. (Marmura 1962, 308) (6) Knowledge of particular existents and events therefore might be impossible to have for the Necessary Existent, because insofar as these existents are prone to corruptibility and therefore change, it would bring about a change in the knowledge of the Necessary Existent, which would render his knowledge plural and that would be a contradictive to His nature as a simple existent.

Comparing Proclus and Avicenna

In our comparison between Avicenna and Proclus we can first off, set out whether they have similar notions of the kind of knowledge that is encompassed by the Necessary Existent. Proclus’ notion of fate allows him to make a clear distinction between a determined world of causal connections and a world, or an Intellect that is able to have an insight into the ‘source of Goodness’. Avicenna posits that the Necessary Existent has knowledge of the order of goods. I think the similarity goes as far as the notion that the source and order of goodness are both found within a self-knowledge of God. This is explicit in Avicenna, but not in Proclus: but since in his account God has a superior knowledge of the good it can be argued that this is self-knowledge precisely because if it was knowledge about something else, then goodness would not be able to emanate from God Himself, but rather from that other thing.

           Providence for Proclus permeates the sensible realm from the celestial realm all the way down into the free will of the human (when it engages in the bodily realm). For Avicenna, it is evidently not clear whether the ‘universal’ knowledge of particular events or even of particular existents that numerically encompass more than the species it belongs to is possible. If we follow the analysis of Marmura however, and we state that it is, in fact, impossible for God to have knowledge of particulars in the sensible world, then the ‘reach’ of God’s knowledge according to Avicenna would be remarkably less than of Proclus’ understanding of Providence (see footnote 6).

           The epistemic mode of Providence is different from the epistemic mode of humans for both philosophers, but they don’t share the same qualities. This is an extension of the previous point made: for both Proclus and Avicenna it is the case that it is not the object of knowledge that determines how it is known; the subject of knowledge, i.e. the knower, determines the mode of thought. For Avicenna this knowledge doesn’t boil down to particular events and existents in the world of corruption and generation; for Proclus however, God’s all-knowing mode of thought permeates every aspect of the sublunary world, but it knows this world in a superior way: that is, he knows the things determinately and clearly which we can only know indeterminately and unclearly.

           In my opinion, Proclus’ position is less problematic with regard to human freedom than Avicenna’s account, since for Proclus free will is a fundamental mode of interaction with the world for the human: it is beyond our everyday and deep comprehension that we can understand the world in a determinate way. Avicenna’s account, on the other hand, does provide us with an assessment of the necessity of accidental evil; apparently it is not the necessity of evil that escapes God’s knowledge, but its accidental character does make it contingent and therefore unknowable for him: so it does seem that the sublunary world, although necessitated by Him, is only partly known by him, that is: he knows the essences of the world, but no particulars, human interaction with the world included.

Conclusion

In this essay, I have attempted to compare the analysis on Providence by Proclus and Avicenna and assess to what extent the Neoplatonic attitude is retained by both thinkers. It has become clear that there are similarities to be made at least between the kind of knowledge Providence is: it belongs to God and its character is that it pertains to self-knowledge. In Proclus’ case God’s Providence penetrates both the celestial and the sensible worlds: in the latter world, however, it isn’t indeterminate knowledge of a seemingly indeterminate and unclear world that encompasses Providence, but it is, in fact, determinate knowledge because God’s knowledge is superior. For Avicenna, God’s Providence only has knowledge of the essence of the corruptible world. Universal knowledge of particulars is possible only in the intellectual spheres. All in all, for both philosophers Providence is a superior kind of knowledge for a supreme being: this paper is not extensive enough to conclude definitively in favour of one of both accounts; However, I recognize Proclus’ concern for the human free will in underlying his metaphysical analysis of God’s knowledge, while Avicenna’s account was more purely metaphysical to begin with while it isn’t applied exclusively to interaction with the human. Of course, it is not the intentions that would render a particular account favourable above the other: Proclus’ account of God’s knowledge does seem to pertain to a more all-knowing form than Avicenna’s, which in my opinion at least has a more conclusive status about the knowledge of God insofar he himself is an all-knowing being in the most ‘superior’ meaning of the word.

Footnotes

1) The point being that both thinkers had different attitudes to what they wanted to proof metaphysically: Both have a notion of a First Existent that is identified as God; but for Avicenna this God is the one and only true God; for Proclus, there are more gods with different qualities. For the sake of simplicity I will use the Necessary Existent and God interchangeably, and they will also encompass Proclus’ First Principle.

2)In no way is this comparison meant to exhaust the topic of Providence in Proclus and Avicenna. For Proclus, I will exclusively focus on his text ‘On Providence’, a letter to his friend who was an eclectic determinist in which he criticizes Stoic determinism and establishes in what way God knows the world, without taking away human freedom. For Avicenna I will focus on two main themes with regard to Providence as set out in his “Metaphysics of Healing”, specifically in book 9, chapter 6 and elsewhere. I must admit that for the interpretation on Avicenna’s notion of God’s knowledge of particulars, I have heavily drawn my views from a very helpful paper by Marmura (1962), as I found Avicenna’s explanation of it quite cryptic.

3) Providence of course does not encompass the First Principle; Providence is rather a quality of the First Principle. It might be the case that the knowledge of the source of goodness is predetermined by the limits of goodness, but since the First Principle is the most superior, its goodness must be the most superior. In this sense it would be a flawed principle if it didn’t ‘live up to its capabilities’, because then it would lack something in itself. The nature of goodness in the First Principle might therefore be determined by itself, but it is only through necessity that it can grasp the fullness of its own goodness; it is the only condition under which grasping any goodness is possible.

4) I might not really explain the concept well here: Evil is accidental in the world: the particulars are in principle good. Fire can heat: but if my clothing is set on fire it impedes my life. In that sense fire is evil. It is therefore through the contingent interaction between certain particularities that evils may accidentally occur. The ‘balance’ of the world is maintained by the necessity of accidental evil: if such accidental evils did not occur, then there would be no contingency at all in a world which is primarily characterized by it due to its generative and corruptible nature. If fire cannot interact with anything anymore, it can’t bring about its full potential, that is to bring heat, because it is potentially able to destroy things and able to put evil into the world: but that’s an impossibility, again, based on the nature of the sensible world.

5) The literature on this topic is quite extensive (e.g. see Marmura 1962 and Nusseibeh 2010 for examples and further suggestions). Also note, for convenience I’m talking only about God’s knowledge, not those of other intellectual spheres)

6) Avicenna, and Michael E Marmura. 2005. The Metaphysics Of The Healing. Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 8.6.17. Marmura seems to have made a slightly different translation in his paper of 1962 in which translates as follows: “if […] the species has many individual instances, then the intellect [my italics] will have no way for arriving at the singular’s description unless one points to it directly to begin with […].” (308). In his 2015 translation the same passage is translated thus: “If […] the species is spread out in individuals, the mind [my italics] will have no access to that thing’s description, unless this [individual] is directly referred to initially […].” (288). I don’t know the Arabic word that has been translated first for intellect and in the second case with mind. I think there is a semantic difference between mind and intellect in that it might pertain to other things if interpreted in a certain way: in both cases I understand that it might not be referring to just the Divine Intellect, certainly if the word mind is used: that might extend this form of knowledge to human understanding as well. If that is the case, we have found an interesting epistemic limitation of both the Intellect and man that both share with regard to knowledge of particularities. It shines in an emphasizing way light on a field in reality that is unknowable to man and God. 

References

Avicenna, and Michael E Marmura. 2005. The Metaphysics Of The Healing. Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press.

Gutas, Dimitri. 2017. "Ibn Sina [Avicenna]". Plato.Stanford.Edu. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ibn-sina/.

Helmig, Christoph, and Carlos Steel. 2017. "Proclus". Plato.Stanford.Edu. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/proclus/.

Marmura, Michael E. 1962. "Some Aspects Of Avicenna's Theory Of God's Knowledge Of Particulars". Journal Of The American Oriental Society 82 (3): 299-312.

Nusseibeh, S. 2010. “Avicenna: Providence and God’s Knowledge of Particulars” in Y. Tzvi Langermann (ed.) Avicenna and his Legacy: A Golden Age of Science and Philosophy. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 275-288.

Proclus, Lycius Diadochus, and Carlos G Steel. 2014. On Providence. London: Bloomsbury.