IR Realism vs Ukraine

The original idea for this post was prompted by an outbreak of International Relations nerdery thanks to some remarks from John Mearsheimer about the Ukraine conflict. It took me a while to dig them up because  I have a problem with using the damned Bird App way too much when I went hunting for them again, I couldn't find them at first. (Thanks, sports and that guy who makes AI Art out of Presidents!)

But I did find them! And it's a thread worth exploring because Professor Poast is correct in his critique of Mearsheimer here. Blaming the US and NATO expansion for the War in Ukraine just doesn't fit the facts and it's distorting a lot of the discourse on the conflict in ways that I find to be somewhat strange. 

I don't like IR Realism as a school. It's too simplistic and awfully smug about it sometimes. But let's accept the notion that big powers want to dominate their regions. What that notion doesn't address is the how. In the case of the United States, it may be dominance by default, as there are no real rivals in the Western hemisphere on a Great Power level yet. In China's case, it's less military and more economic + military projection. Russia is the only Great Power that seems to be stuck in the traditional IR Realism way of thinking and I think it's failing as a result. (You could also argue that it's butting up on the EU's sphere of influence and you might convince me, but... eh. Push on that comparison a bit and it gets messy.)

If you grew up in the Cold War, I can understand how the threat of nuclear armageddon might have embedded itself into your neurons a bit. I get that. But what I don't understand is why you think letting Russia just steamroll Ukraine will lower the risks of an actual conflict between NATO and Russia- which is something we all should want to avoid. To me, this is simple: there is no guarantee whatsoever that Russia will stop with Ukraine. It's got its eyes on Moldova already. Say we cut bait and get out of the way and let Russia do whatever... at worst, we see Ukraine forced back into Russia, akin to what they're trying to do with Belarus. At a minimum, we see a  quasi-independent Ukraine with Russia's bootheel on its neck. Either way, we end up with an expansionist/revanchist Russia right up on top of NATO countries and while we are running some risks now if Russia steamrolls Ukraine, those risks would become unacceptable to me.

(I'm beginning to think it's more of a generational thing than I thought it was because I feel like a lot of older Millenial/GenX types are deadset against it and immediately go to 'LET'S NOT HAVE WORLD WAR THREE' instead of actually thinking it through.)

So my conclusion remains more or less the same: should we be concerned about the potential for conflict with Russia doing what we're doing now? Yes. Are there risks to doing what we're doing now? Yes. Those risks increase to unacceptable levels if we let Putin get his way in Ukraine.

I know she's probably not a popular person to cite, but in this case, Condoleeza Rice is correct. These conflicts do have a tendency to wind up on our doorstep. I get that after 20 years of nation-building in Afghanistan and Iraq, the voters (though not the Establishment) are moving in a more isolationist direction, but making sure we shut this shit down now so we don't have to deal with it later and actually get boots on the ground tracks with that. If you don't want yet another European mess, then we should give Ukraine whatever they need and let them defend their country, because so far, they're doing a pretty decent job at it.

(BTW: I remember early in the war last year, there was a clip floating around of some old babushka going up to Russian soldiers and offering them sunflowers. Not because she was trying to be nice, but because she wanted them to have something to place on their graves when they died there. My initial reaction was, "God DAMN." but as it turns out, that old babushka had the right of it.)

I remain on Team Do This Now, Because It'll Be Much Worse Later If We Don't. (It's a long team name, I know, but it'll fit nicely on the back of a jacket if you shrink the font down.)

If we don't, then there's no reason to believe Russia will stop, and if you think the Baltics- who've had their independence snuffed out by Russia before- are going to go gently back into the warm embrace of Mother Russia. Think again. If you think Poland is going to be fucked with after the 20th Century they've had. Think again. It will be much worse later if we don't do this now.

That's not to say the critics of our current policy don't have some legitimate points to make.

First, there should be more oversight. The Pentagon can't even pass an audit, I think elected representatives being like, "hey man, where's the money going" is well within their purview and you can argue that it's their responsibility to do so.

(Also: no uranium shells. No banned cluster munitions. Come on, y'all. What are we doing here?)

Second, asking what the end game should be is also a legitimate question. A ceasefire for the sake of a ceasefire is an obvious non-starter. A ceasefire coupled with negotiations and a withdrawal of troops back to either the status quo ante borders could be reasonable- obviously, everything would have to be verified to the satisfaction of all parties, but you gotta start somewhere and I think the US and Ukraine need to start getting some messaging out there about what they'll accept as a starting point for a solution. Not doing it or dismissing China's call for a ceasefire out of hand isn't okay- there was a map floating around that China was proposing, that was profoundly unserious, though the text of their twelve-point plant itself seems... okay, if vague.  

We (meaning the United States/West) need to have a quiet sit down with Ukraine and make sure they know what our red lines are. (I'm sure we've already done this, but if not, we should have.) I would also quietly find out what Russia wants in terms of security guarantees and dangle those as a carrot after a verified ceasefire/withdrawal.

Finally, we've got to deal with the chicken versus egg problem of the Ukraine discourse: NATO expansion.  This is where Mearsheimer and a lot of the realists fall flat in their critiques of the current conflict and NATO expansion, IMO. The three main tenants of IR realism are statism, survival, and self-help.

Let's accept the first two tenets right away: states are the main actors of international politics, the international system is governed by anarchy with no central authority and it all comes down to a struggle for power between states. 

I'll accept self-help too, but with a caveat: I always hated realism, because it was so hard to argue against and I loved trying to poke holes in whenever I could back in grad school (I found constructivism to be a lot more persuasive)- but realism falls down with its obsession with big states/powers. It doesn't really an answer for what to do when small states band together to avoid domination by a big power. Its tenet of self-help says that 'no other states can be relied upon to help guarantee the state's survival' but the post-Cold War landscape of Eastern Europe would suggest otherwise.

All the discourse about the Ukraine War misses this. The West is the irresponsible one. The West allowed NATO expansion to happen. The West is merely protecting its sphere of influence. 

If states are the main actors on the international stage, what if smaller states band together to ensure their own security? Having been under Soviet occupation for most of the Cold War, all these commentators seem to miss the fact that while America probably isn't the most popular country in the world, all of these Eastern European countries aren't fans of Russia either. Joining NATO was the best way for those countries to ensure their continued independence and security against Russia.  

And that's the chicken versus egg of it all: did the West seek NATO expansion or did these countries want to protect themselves and gain security guarantees against future aggression by Russia?

Well, well, Russia is just protecting its sphere of influence against NATO expansion!

Eh... well, the idea that NATO expansion caused this would be a lot more believable if Russia didn't have a long and verifiable history of fucking with countries in its periphery. Do you want me to buy that it's all NATO's fault? Ok, if Russia pulls out of Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, etc- then we can talk. Otherwise, I ain't buying it. Every action has an equal and opposite reaction and I don't see many former Soviet countries exactly rushing to help out Putin in Ukraine- it's because they don't like Russia either. It's because 'spheres of influence' as a concept don't fit well in the present moment.

Sphere of influence is an increasingly bullshit concept and it's an equally bullshit argument. The end of the Cold War nullified a lot of that thinking from the West's point of view. How many times did we hear "America shouldn't be the world's policeman" in the 1990s? How many? That's not to say that the concept doesn't obviously have its fans in the Establishment-- but we're just not into it anymore. Sure, we tried a coup in Bolivia. Didn't take. We tried a coup in Venezuela. Didn't take.  It's been 30 years since we intervened militarily in any countries in the Western hemisphere- something we did a lot of at the start of the 20th Century- we occupied multiple countries for decades. Not anymore.

I don't think realist thinking has caught up with the post-Cold War landscape yet.  Russia may still think that way- and their foreign policy over the past three decades certainly reflects that (two wars in Chechnya, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, invasion of Georgia in 2008, invasion of Crimea in 2014, Transnistria) but I'm not convinced that The West operates that way anymore. Increasingly, the EU might, but the EU + America? The Anglosphere? I think it gets messier there, because the obvious Great Power Rival to The West- however you define it, is China.

(IR Realists will have a better time with China, I think.)

So, what do I think will happen? 

I think both The West and China should be looking for conditions to get both sides to the negotiating table, if possible. I don't think either side has a reason to do so right now- because why should Ukraine surrender a damn thing? They're holding their own against Russia and they were invaded! Russia has committed war crimes and stolen their children! And why should Russia talk? Any move to sit down and negotiate right now for Russia would come from a position of weakness, not strength. They aren't going to want to talk unless they've got a stronger hand or have no other choice.

How do I think it'll get there? The Ukrainians aren't stupid and probably are quite aware of the upcoming Presidential election in the United States. I think the closer that gets, the more important a breakthrough becomes. It's not a sure thing that this will be done by 2025, or 2026, but that's what I would guess for right now... if Ukraine wants to come out ahead, I would expect them to make significant breakthroughs/gains before then and I think that might be possible. If it's me, I'm looking to cut the land bridge to Crimea and make Russia choose between Crimea or Donbas. I think Putin picks Crimea, myself, but if all goes south, it's not inconceivable that Ukraine could make a push there as well. 

That's where I stand on Ukraine. Our current policy could be improved in some areas. It's not perfect. It does run some risks. But right now, they're acceptable risks. I don't want us to get into a situation where we're dealing with unacceptable risks- especially when we're going up against Russia.